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Abstract
Market views on EMU enlargement are measured by a new indicator based on the short-
term dynamics of forward spreads. Conceptually, this indicator stems from the notion
of uncertainty averse agents and equilibrium indeterminacy. The method was applied on
data from central European countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia. Comparing our results with ﬁnancial market opinion surveys, the results of
the proposed method seems to be in accordance with market expectations.
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Nontechnical Summary
This paper proposes a novel and theoretically motivated method for the measurement of mar-
ket beliefs (probability) of future euro area enlargement. It is a relevant topic for the central
bank, because the reaction of forward-looking market participants to current monetary policy
may depend strongly on agents’ assessment of future EMU membership. Indeed, there is an
alternative way available for determining market expectations, i.e. to rely on survey evidence.
However, responses in the surveys do not necessarily reﬂect respondents’ beliefs, and it is im-
portant to have a method based on market data which is compatible with market participants’
expectations.
This paper differs from other so-called EMU calculators in its attempt to use the dynamics
of interest rate spreads, while the typical calculator is based on the level of the spreads. Our
approach might be particularly useful when interest rate forward spreads are very narrow, which
makes level-based methods difﬁcult to apply.
The theoretical background to the paper is the theory of uncertainty aversion1 (as opposed to
risk aversion) originally studied by Bewley and recently developed by Rigotti and Shannon.
We use this theory to support the intuitive notion that short-term noisy ﬂuctuations in forward
spreads do not necessarily reﬂect changes in fundamentals and beliefs. In standard models
(with rational, forward-looking, risk-averse agents, which maximise their expected utility and
in which the ﬁnancial markets are frictionless), it is hard to achieve such decoupling. In them,
any change in the market price reﬂects information about fundamentals. On the contrary, fun-
damentals and beliefs in our model only constrain the process of day-to-day changes in forward
spreads and may only lead to error correction behaviour. This stems from the fact that the cur-
rent framework of ambiguity aversion allows more than one market equilibrium supported by
one set of fundamentals. In fact, a continuum of equilibrium prices and quantities is possible.
In the applied part we rely on a simple version of our model that takes the form of linear error
correction. We investigate Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Reassuringly, our empirical results correspond well with the
ﬁndingsoftheReutersEMUPollsurveyfortheCzechRepublic, Slovakia, HungaryandPoland.
Speciﬁcally, as the table shows, the expected entry years indicated by our estimation procedure
as of May 2006 correspond well with the latest expected dates from the EMU Poll:
Estimated date Latest date from the survey
Czech Republic 2014 2015
Slovakia 2011 2011
Hungary > 2015 2016
Poland > 2015 2015
Therefore, using this evidence, one may conclude that the surveys may serve as a reliable proxy
for true market expectations.
1 Sometimes the term ambiguity aversion is used.EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 3
1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the measurement of how markets perceive the
prospects of future euro area enlargement. For a monetary authority this is a relevant analysis,
because ﬁnancial market participants are forward looking. Therefore, their reactions to changes
in ofﬁcial short-term rates depend on their beliefs about the future time path of interest rates.
Future interest rates depend on entry into the monetary union. Thus, to have a good forecast of
how the markets will react to current monetary policy, one needs to measure what they think
about the EMU prospects of the national economy.
Even before the EMU was launched in 1999 considerable interest was focused on methods of
extracting market views of the project, and various methods were designed to infer the proba-
bility of a particular country becoming a member of the EMU.
In the EMU calculators, which are typically2 based on the term structure of interest rates, the
EMU entry of a given country is treated as a random event and observed or implied interest
rate forwards are used to estimate its probability. In particular, forward spreads are viewed as a
weighted average of zero, stemming from the union scenario being realised, and some non-zero
value of the non-EMU scenario.
In our approach we attempt to recover additional information by analysing the short-term dy-
namics of forward spreads. To justify this we appeal to the robust equilibrium indeterminacy
arising in the ambiguity aversion model of Rigotti and Shannon (2005). We argue that this
approach might be particularly useful when forward spreads are narrow.
In general, there are two ways to assess market perceptions. They can be inferred from prices of
market instruments or, alternatively, survey evidence can be relied upon. It is of signiﬁcance to
cross-check these two information sources, because the beliefs expressed in the surveys are not
necessarily incentive compatible and may differ from the beliefs or assumptions that investors
act on. Therefore, we compare the results of our market-data-based method with the results of
the Reuters opinion survey.
The relationship between forwards, the probability of EMU membership at time ¿ and the
















where r¿;T and r¤
¿;T denote respectively national and foreign (euro area) interest rates3 as of time
¿ and with maturity T. Further, ft;¿;T and f¤
t;¿;T are domestic and foreign interest rate forwards
as of time t, with horizon ¿ and maturity T. Indeed, all the probability distributions involved in
relationship (1.1) are risk-neutral ones. The literature mostly ignores this fact, although Bates
(1999) argues that this neglect is harmless.
2 Bates (1999) surveys the methods and categorises them between those based on currency option contracts (e.g.,
Butler and Cooper, 1997; Aguilar and H¨ ordahl, 1998) and methods utilising European forward interest rates (e.g.,
JPMorgan, 1997; Favero, Giavazzi, Iacone and Tabellini, 2000; Angeloni and Violi, 1997; Lund, 1999). A lack
of data hinders use of the option based approaches. At the time of the analysis the earliest new EMU entrants
could have been expected in several years’ time, but the maturity of the interbank currency option contracts for the
analysed countries did not extend much over one year. Also, it is too early to apply the time series exchange rate
models. Indeed, Aguilar and H¨ ordahl (1998) show that GARCH volatility estimates fell to very low levels only
around two years before the EMU was launched.
3 Before the EMU was launched the asterisk usually denoted Germany, but in the current context it denotes Euro-
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There are several complications regarding equation (1.1). First, forward rates for long horizons
on the left-hand side might not be traded and then implied forwards need to be estimated.
Nevertheless, estimating them from yield or swap curves is quite straightforward and reliable
under the no-arbitrage assumption. In the applied part we rely on implied forwards estimated
from interest rate swaps via the bootstrapping method.
Second, a much more difﬁcult problem is how to determine the expected future interest rate
spread conditional on non-EMU membership at time ¿. This is the major aspect in which the
term-structure based calculators differ.
Third, as Bates (1999) notes, the EMU calculators are most robust when national and foreign
(euro area) interest rates would differ substantially in the case of the country not joining. In
other words, formula (1.1) can form a basis for estimating ¼EMU






is large enough in absolute terms. Otherwise, forecast er-
rors and other potential biases would make the EMU and non-EMU cases hard to distinguish
and ¼EMU
t;¿ would not be identiﬁable. Therefore, the early research focused mainly on Italy
and several other countries with a history of substantial interest rate differentials that could be
extrapolated into the future as non-EMU interest rate paths4. However, low inﬂation has pre-
vailed in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and many of these potential euro area
entrants have independent central banks pursuing inﬂation targets close to the ECB target. One
can assume that the low inﬂation environment would be sustained and that interest rate spreads
would remain low regardless of whether these countries join the euro area. The Czech Republic
is a good example of a country for which the EMU and non-EMU scenarios for interest rates
could be too close for making reliable assessments about the EMU probabilities using forward
rate levels only.
Finally, in our view there is the crucial issue of how to interpret daily ﬂuctuations in forward
spreads. Both explanatory factors of the current forward spread on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (1.1) characterise medium to long-term expectations, and the fundamental information that
could affect them arrives at a relatively low frequency. In other words, it does not seem rea-






can vary in such a way as to explain
the short-term ﬂuctuations of ft;¿;T ¡ f¤
t;¿;T. However, the short-term dynamics might contain
useful information, especially when the conditional non-EMU interest rate spread is low and
the probability of entry is high.
These issues are addressed in section 2, where we develop a framework involving Bewley pref-
erences and equilibrium indeterminacy. In section 3 the estimation of a linearised version of
this model is estimated for forward spreads of several CEE countries. These empirical results
are in section 4 pit against market surveys and discusses ofﬁcial euro strategies, because these
are natural reference points for methods aimed at measuring market views. Section 5 concludes.
The Appendix discusses the estimation of forward rates.
2. Utilising the Short-term Dynamics of Forward Spreads
Relationship (1.1) is an abstraction which neglects short-term inﬂuences that may cause day-to-
day ﬂuctuations in the observed forward spreads. We can write a formal decomposition of the
4 For instance, at the beginning of 1996, three years before the EMU was launched, the long horizon spreads for
Italy were close to four percentage points.EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 5










¢FEQ + ²t;¿; (2.2)
However, we need to clarify which factors might be behind the noise. In fact, it is difﬁcult to
explain short-term ﬂuctuations with relatively stable fundamentals (i.e. probability ¼EMU
t;¿ and
the factors behind the expected future interest rate spread) and to keep the simple paradigm
of frictionless markets dominated by rational agents who maximise their expected utility. The
modern ﬁnancial markets always clear and an equilibrium situation prevails. Therefore, one
needs a model that allows multiple equilibria supported by one set of fundamentals. One possi-
ble option is the general equilibrium model with uncertainty averse agents developed by Rigotti
and Shannon (2005). This model features ﬁnancial markets that are characterised by robust in-
determinacy in equilibrium prices and allocations for any speciﬁcation for initial endowments.
2.1 Equilibrium Indeterminacy
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is a promising way of addressing various ﬁnancial
market puzzles. In the Knightian sense (Knight, 1921), agents face risk when they know the
probability distribution of an event. But the event is uncertain when the distribution itself is
unknown. Since the expected utility is not readily deﬁned in this framework, there has to be an
alternative way of modelling the preferences of agents.
Theories of uncertainty aversion have become increasingly studied recently. Backus, Routledge
and Zin (2004) provide an overview of ways of modelling exotic preferences, and a very in-
complete list of the more recent research on the subject and its application includes Mukerji
and Tallon (2004a,b), Barillas, Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Hansen and Sargent (2007).
In our application, we appeal to Rigotti and Shannon (2005), who, inspired by Bewley (2002),
consider a general equilibrium model in which agents’ beliefs may be characterised by multiple
priors and in which an agent prefers one consumption bundle to another one if it has a larger
expected utility for all priors that the agent considers to be reasonable.
For example, agents may estimate the future interest rate differential using some econometric
model, perhaps in a way similar to JPMorgan (1997) or Favero et al. (2000), but they cannot be
certain that their model is correct. But even if they believe in the model, they cannot estimate its
parameters exactly, because they have only a limited number of observations. They can estimate
the mean and variance of the future interest rate spread only with an error. In effect, they
obtain not a single distribution of future interest rates, but rather a set of distributions, perhaps
characterised by conﬁdence intervals of means and variances. Or viewed from a Bayesian
perspective, they arrive at a joint distribution of parameters and variables.
Agents who maximise their expected utility would use the estimated distribution of these pa-
rameters and calculate the posterior forecast, but uncertainty averse agents make a different
choice. They are indifferent with regard to the outcomes associated with any of the admissible
distributions. In other words, an agent who is maximising his expected utility cares even about
a marginal difference between the market and his theoretical price, while uncertainty averse
agents do not mind unless the difference is signiﬁcant.6 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
2.2 Ambiguity Aversion in the Context of EMU Calculators
In this section we show that ambiguity aversion may explain the existence of an interval of for-
ward spreads that are all consistent with one set of fundamentals. First, some further notation
needs to be introduced. All the contracts we are dealing with are of the same maturity. There-
fore, for simplicity, the subscript T indicating their maturity can be dropped. Furthermore, let
x¿ = r¿ ¡r¤
¿ denote the future spread as of date ¿. And let y¿ be a Bernoulli variable for which
y¿ = 1 if the country is an EMU member at time ¿ and y¿ = 0 if it is not.
Since the money markets merge under EMU membership, rational agents must believe that
x¿ = 0 in such case. However in the non-EMU cases, x¿ could be a random variable described
at time t by some probability distribution function.
Agents face uncertainty and so their beliefs about x¿ may be characterised by more than one
distribution. Denote by ¡t;¿ a collection of distributions that agents consider reasonable. For-
mally, the distributions of the future interest rate spread conditional on EMU membership at
time ¿ as perceived by market participants at time t can be written as
pt(x¿ = 0jy¿ = 1) = 1 (2.3)
pt(x¿ jy¿ = 0) 2 ¡t;¿ (2.4)
Agents are also uncertain about the marginal distribution of y¿. This uncertainty about the
Bernoulli distribution is described by some subset ¦t;¿ of the unit interval so that pt(y¿ = 1) 2
¦t;¿.
The joint distribution of the EMU-membership indicator y¿ and the spread x¿ can be factorised
as pt(x¿;y¿) = pt(x¿jy¿)pt(y¿) and therefore the set of reasonable joint distributions Ht;¿ is
Ht;¿ = fpt;¿ : pt;¿ = pt (x¿jy¿)pt (y¿), where pt (x¿jy¿) satisﬁes (2.3) to (2.4) and pt (y¿ = 1) 2 ¦t;¿g
(2.5)
If the distribution of future spreads and EMU membership is exogenous for market participants,
it is possible to use the indeterminacy result of Rigotti and Shannon (2005). They show that
any equilibrium with some set of beliefs is also an equilibrium with a larger set of beliefs.
Furthermore, if there is a unique equilibrium only with risk (i.e. with no uncertainty) then all
equilibria under uncertainty converge to that risk equilibrium as uncertainty shrinks.
Let us further assume that there exists an equilibrium only with risk for every distributionin Ht;¿
and denote by e Ht;¿ the set of these risk neutral counterparts. Any ~ pt;¿ 2 e Ht;¿ can be factorised
as
~ pt;¿ ´ ~ pt(x¿;y¿) = ~ pt(x¿jy¿)~ pt(y¿): (2.6)
The deﬁnitions of e ¡t;¿ and e ¦t;¿ follow:
e ¡t;¿ = f~ gt;¿ : ~ gt (x¿) = ~ pt (x¿jy¿ = 0) for any ~ pt;¿ 2 e Ht;¿g; (2.7)




t;¿ = ~ pt (y¿ = 1) for any ~ pt;¿ 2 e Ht;¿g: (2.8)EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 7
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We can see that there may exist an interval of forward rate differentials consistent with agents’
beliefs. For example, assume that e ¦t;¿ = h¼L
t;¿;¼H
t;¿i and also that °L
t;¿ = inf~ gt;¿2e ¡t;¿ E~ gt;¿ (x¿)
and °H
t;¿ = sup~ gt;¿2e ¡t;¿ E~ gt;¿ (x¿) and that the union of all admissible E~ gt;¿ (x¿) is also an inter-
val. Then it follows from (2.9) that the equilibrium forward rate differential falls in the interval
between BL
t;¿ = (1 ¡ ¼H
t;¿)°L
t;¿ and BH
t;¿ = (1 ¡ ¼L
t;¿)°H
t;¿.
The size of this band depends on the level of the EMU-membership probability and on the
magnitudeoftheuncertaintiesinvolved. Forexample, assumethattheestimatedexpectedfuture
spread is 200 basis points (b.p.) and that the 95% conﬁdence interval of this estimate is 150 b.p.
wide. Therefore, we might put °L
t;¿ = 125b:p: and °H
t;¿ = 275b:p: Unless agents are 100% sure
thatthecountrywillbeamemberstateatagivendate¿, therecouldbeanintervalofequilibrium
forward spreads. For example, if the uncertainty is e ¦t;¿ = h0:9;1i then any forward spread in
h0;35i b.p. can represent equilibrium. However, consider the same uncertainty about EMU
membership but for a lower probability level; for example let e ¦t;¿ = h0:4;0:5i. In this case the
band of equilibrium spreads would be much wider, at h62:5;165i b.p.
2.3 Band of Inaction with Fully Optimising Speculators
Here we argue that the band of inaction may arise even when the most relevant agents maximise
expected utility. Assume that there are two types of market participants, namely hedgers and
speculators.
Hedgers enter the market to unload their idiosyncratic interest rate position. These might be, for
example, banks with a mismatch between their assets and liabilities or corporations that trade
swaps to exploit their comparative advantage in the respective market segments. We assume
that they do not have any predictive ability regarding the future interest rate path. In terms of
the Rigotti and Shannon (2005) model, one may view them as being uncertainty averse, and
considering any distribution of future spreads reasonable.
On the other hand, we assume that speculators are expected utility maximisers. At the same
time, they gather information and have a good forecasting capability and, therefore, they are
those who actually determine the market price and make it informative. We assume that they
have no natural position in the future interest rate spread and thus they do not have any hedging
needs.
Consider the speculator’s problem. If his theoretical future value is higher than the market
forward value, then he might consider opening a long forward position. However, he would
enter the deal only if its expected return is high enough to compensate for the risk involved.
If we abstract from correlations of such investment with returns of other contracts, then its
expected return per unit of standard error should be positive. On the other hand, we assume that
there is an upper bound for the Sharpe ratio of any available contract. Any deal with a higher
Sharpe ratio would be just too good and would be quickly arbitraged away. Let ¸max
t denote





t : (2.10)8 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
In the context of standard asset pricing models ¸max
t could be identiﬁed with the Sharpe ratio of
the market portfolio.
Let ^ pt;¿ and ^ gt;¿ denote the forecast distributions that characterise the beliefs of the speculator
as of time t. Denote also ^ ¼t;¿ = ^ pt;¿(y¿ = 1) and §2
t;¿ = var^ gt;¿(x¿). Then his expectations of
the future interest rate spread and its variance read:
E





= (1 ¡ ^ ¼¿)E
^ gt;¿ (x¿)
var










= (1 ¡ ^ ¼¿)§
2
t;¿ + ^ ¼t;¿(1 ¡ ^ ¼¿)E
^ gt;¿ (x¿)
2 : (2.11)
The expected proﬁt from a long position in the forward spread is therefore
E
^ pt;¿ ¡




= (1 ¡ ^ ¼t;¿)E
^ gt;¿ (x¿) ¡ (ft;¿ ¡ f
¤
t;¿); (2.12)
and the variance of this proﬁt is
var
^ pt;¿ ¡




= (1 ¡ ^ ¼t;¿)f§
2
t;¿ + ^ ¼¿ E
^ gt;¿ (x¿)
2g: (2.13)
It follows from (2.10) that
¯
¯(1 ¡ ^ ¼t;¿)E








(1 ¡ ^ ¼t;¿)f§2
t;¿ + ^ ¼t;¿ E^ gt;¿ (x¿)
2g: (2.14)
Inequality (2.14) shows us that there is an interval of admissible forward spreads consistent
with a single set of fundamentals reﬂected in speculators’ beliefs ^ ¼t;¿, E^ gt;¿ (x¿) and §t;¿. The
right-hand side of inequality (2.14) shows the maximum deviation of the forward spread from
the theoretical value which is not arbitraged away. It also deﬁnes a band of inaction; any
forward spread within the band may represent some market equilibrium. Thus, within the band
the forward spread may ﬂuctuate erratically, responding to the immediate supply and demand
conditions. But forward-looking agents (i.e. speculators) would prevent the price from moving
beyond the band’s boundary.
2.4 Model Predictions
Inequality(2.14)impliesthat whenmarketsare not 100%surethatthe countrywillbeamember
of the monetary union, i.e. when ^ ¼t;¿ < 1, then the width of this band is positive.
Furthermore, the less precise is the market estimate of the non-EMU conditional spread (i.e.
the greater is §2
t;¿), the wider is the band. Also, the greater is the estimated non-EMU spread
E^ gt;¿ (x¿), the wider is the band. For wider bands it could be more difﬁcult to detect any error
correction. Therefore, it could be more difﬁcult to ﬁnd any error correction for countries with a
history of volatile and high interest rate spreads. These may be countries that are less integrated
into European trade or countries with a history of high inﬂation.
There is some ambiguity as regards the dependence on the horizon ¿. There may be two factors
pulling in opposite directions. The percieved probability of entry ^ ¼t;¿ is – at least in the baseline
scenario – non-decreasing as a function of horizon. This would lead to a narrowing band. On
the contrary, the forecasting error §2
t;¿ increases with the horizon making the inactivity bandEMU Calculators and Ambiguity 9
wider. The actual balance of the two effects depends on features of individual countries. The
ﬁrst effect could be weak for countries that are likely to join soon because for them ^ ¼t;¿ is quite
high already for short horizons. The second effect is likely to be stronger for countries that are
for some reason more difﬁcult to analyse.
Moreover, for given beliefs regarding the non-EMU spread, the band width also depends on the
perceived probability ^ ¼t;¿. In particular, for §2
t;¿ > E^ gt;¿ (x¿)
2 the band monotonically widens
with declining ^ ¼t;¿, otherwise there is a point ^ ¼¤




that maximises the size of the region where prices are not informative.
This dependence is important for the reliability of EMU calculators, which may be relatively
high when ^ ¼t;¿ ! 1 but declines quickly when EMU membership becomes less likely.
2.5 Noise Distribution
The goal of this section is to provide a link between relationship (2.2) and the models of sections
2.1 and 2.3: The reality is more complicated than simple two-period models. Agents are het-
erogeneous, and there will be trading between times t and ¿. Therefore, one can hardly expect
any sharp breaks at the edges of the indifference interval. It might be more natural to view them
as fuzzy reﬂecting barriers which push the market back with an intensity negatively dependent
on the distance between the market price and the barrier.
The reﬂecting barriers can be modelled so that the forward spread walks randomly when it
appears far enough from any of the barriers, but is pushed strongly back if it approaches a
barrier or even moves beyond it. Therefore, when the band is wide enough one might note
almost no error correction, but for a narrow band the error correction could be very strong.
Thenonlinearerror-correctionbehaviourofft;¿ andf¤
t;¿, whichdependsonthespread’sdistance
from the barriers BL
t¡1;¿ and BH







































where k(x) = ae¡ b
ax for x ¸ 0 and k(x) = ¡x + a for x < 0. Here parameter b controls
how thick the barrier is, while a determines how strongly it pushes back. Moreover, parameter
a must depend on the width of the band. While it needs to accommodate narrow bands, it








, where parameter A > 0 would represent the maximum push for
the very wide bands as limtanh(x) = 1 for x ! 1.
Finally, function k¤ is deﬁned similarly, except that a, b and A are replaced by a¤, b¤ and A¤.
In this speciﬁcation, when far enough from any of the barriers the variable can walk almost
randomly with a very small drift towards the middle point of the band.
In the empirical part we use a linear approximation of equations (2.15) and (2.16). However,
the nonlinear speciﬁcation is useful for interpretation of the estimated linear error correction
coefﬁcients. They represent the average reaction, which is low for bands that are wide relative
to the size of shocks and high for narrow bands. As discussed above, the width of the bands is
related to the uncertainty and also to the level of perceived EMU probability.10 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a











































Assuming for simplicity that ®L = ®H = 2® and ®¤
L = ®¤
























¢FEQ. If it moves only slowly with t
or if it is constant, then (2.19) and (2.20) can represent an error correction mechanism for the
cointegrating relationship (2.2).
3. Estimation and Empirical Results
If the time series of ft;¿ and f¤
t;¿ are not stationary, then (2.2) deﬁnes a cointegrating relationship
between them. If the non-stationarity of the estimated forward spread can be rejected and the
series do not diverge, then we may estimate the error-correction model
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Using this model we analysed the dynamics of forward differentials against euro rates for sev-
eral European countries. The countries were selected to have distinct prospects of becoming
EMU members and also to have different economic characteristics. In particular, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland were analysed. This selection was dictated mainly by
data availability. We also considered useful to do the same analysis for some other countries
with no or a negligible chance to adopt euro any time soon. Indeed, benchmark results for these
countries might help to assess overall usefulness of the method. Therefore, we also analysed
Denmark (narrow ERM II band, opt-out clause), Sweden (wide ERM II band, no opt-out clause)
and the UK (outside the ERM II opt-out clause).
Because we replace ¯t;¿ in (2.19) and (2.20) by a constant ¯C, there is a trade off as regards the
sample length. The time series should be as long as possible to capture the dynamic properties,
but on the other hand the market assessment of the country’s prospects of joining the union may
evolve over time, so in this respect a shorter sample would be more desirable. As a compromise
we choose to estimate the above speciﬁcation for the four-month period running up to May
2006, when our sample ﬁnishes.
For the sample period we estimated the average error correction coefﬁcients for each country
and horizon and tested the residuals for stationarity. To do so we employed the augmented
Engle-Granger (AEG) test for residual-based cointegration with a constant and time trend. We
used the critical values devised by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 11
Section 2.4 suggests that several regularities should be observed. First, from the discussion of
equation (2.14) it follows that the higher is the perceived probability of EMU entry, the tighter
should be the no-arbitrage band. For a given disturbance size, a higher perceived probability
should lead to higher linear error correction coefﬁcients. Therefore, some prospective EMU
entrants might exhibit higher coefﬁcients as the forward horizon increases. This more or less
holds for the Czech republic, for which it is unclear when it intends to enter, but which has
a stable and transparent monetary policy and therefore the perceived distribution of non-EMU
future spreads might not depend strongly on the horizon.
On the other hand, Slovakia has articulated its willingnes to become an EMU member quickly.
Thus, the error-correction coefﬁcients do not necessarily need to be increasing function of the
horizon, they may even decline for long horizons as a result of increasing §t;¿.
Conversely, for countries with no EMU prospects one should observe no horizon dependence.
Moreover, for countries with independent monetary policy, such as the UK or Switzerland, one
might even expect no cointegration. On the other hand, for countries with low ¼EMU
¿ but closely
linked to the EMU, for example by a ﬁxed exchange rate regime (e.g. Denmark), cointegration
should be detected due to presumably low §t;¿.
Also, higher uncertainty regarding the conditional non-EMU spread, and also a higher expected
value thereof, should lead to a wider band and consequently to lower coefﬁcient estimates.
Therefore, countries with a history of relatively high and volatile spreads could have weaker
error correction. Thus, we might expect Poland and Hungary to exhibit lower coefﬁcients than,
for example, the Czech Republic.
Furthermore, since a small country’s rate is more likely to be attracted to the euro rate than vice
versa, it seems reasonable to expect that most of the adjustment would happen through changes
in ft;¿ rather than f¤
t;¿. Therefore, we might expect ®C · 0 and ®¤
C ¼ 0:
3.1 Data and Estimation of Implied Forwards
Forward contracts are traded for some maturities and horizons, but the implied forwards most
often have to be estimated. Estimation is possible using government bond yields or interest rate
swap rates. This issue is mostly technical and, compared to the other potential difﬁculties, is
relatively easy to tackle. But it may gain in importance when the absolute difference between
forward rates is low relative to the potential errors introduced by the estimation methods.
While Favero et al. (2000) estimate instantaneous forward rates from government bond yields
using the speciﬁcation of Svensson (1994), Lund (1999) derives instantaneous forwards from
the zero-coupon curve estimated using the bootstrap method with linear interpolation from in-
terest rate swaps. Others, like JPMorgan (1997) or Angeloni and Violi (1997), directly used
forward rates with ﬁnite maturity (ﬁve- and one-year maturity respectively), also derived from
interest rate swap rates. As described in Favero et al. (2000), since the forward rate with horizon
¿ and maturity T; i.e. ft;¿, is the average of instantaneous forward rates over the period between
¿ and ¿ + T; the estimated probability in this case is rather the average of the ‘instantaneous’
probabilities over the period weighted by the interest rate differentials.
For estimating forward rates, we prefer to use benchmark interest rate swaps rather than govern-
ment bond yields, because they are standardised and have a favourable structure, which allows
for derivation of precise zero coupon curves. This is important because we have to deal with12 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
relatively narrow forward spreads and therefore we tried to avoid any interpolation and ad hoc
speciﬁcation. Therefore, we did not follow Favero et al. (2000) or Lund (1999) in estimating
instantaneous forwards from the Nelson-Siegel speciﬁcation, but rather adapted the approach
of Angeloni and Violi (1997).
We estimated one-year forwards directly from benchmark interest rate swaps, quoted in annual
maturities. The daily data are available from Bloomberg. First, to extract the term structure
of interest rates (the zero coupon curve) we used the bootstrapping procedure (see section 5),
which relies only on an assumption of liquid and well arbitraged markets. Then we calculated
the implied synthetic one-year forward rates for different horizons.
In general, the data on the benchmark IRS curves are of very good quality, but some large
outliers may occur. We checked the data very carefully and cleaned these obvious data errors.
The solid lines on Figure 5.1 graph the IRS yield curves for several countries in comparison
with the euro benchmark curve, plotted as a dashed line. Figure 5.2 shows the dynamics of
Czech forward rates in relation to euro rates. Similar graphs for other countries are shown in
Figures 5.3 to 5.8.
3.2 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland
The estimates for the Czech Republic listed in Table 5.1 reﬂect the predictions of the model
well. Moreover, they are also consistent with surveys of ﬁnance professionals in the Reuters
poll reported in Table 4.1. This is encouraging, as the method is intended to gauge market
views.
The implied forward spreads for the Czech Republic can be considered stationary for all hori-
zons over two years. Moreover, the speeds of adjustment parameters ®CZK are all signiﬁcantly
negative and intuitively sized. They increase with the forward horizon and become almost unity
for 8-year horizon forwards. This ﬁts well with the Reuters poll. At the time the survey was
conducted, all the respondents thought that the Czech Republic would be an EMU member by
2015 at the latest. It is also reassuring that the euro adjustment parameter ®¤
CZK is insigniﬁcant.
The negative value of the equilibrium spread ¯CZK should not be surprising given the main
characteristics of the Czech economy. These include an inﬂation target of the Czech National
Bank that is quite close to that of the euro area, and real appreciation, which apparently stems
from the converging economy. These two factors imply trend appreciation of the Czech koruna
and, through the interest parity condition, low domestic interest rates.
The results suggest that for short horizons the markets focus on domestic macroeconomic in-
dicators and the inﬂation forecast of the Czech National Bank, while the long end is likely
to be driven by EMU pricing. The current trading practice seems to be in line with such an
understanding, as has been conﬁrmed in informal discussions with ﬁxed income dealers.
This interpretation, if true, would have important consequences for the monetary policy of the
Czech National Bank. It would mean that even now it can steer only a part of the forward curve,
and the closer the uniﬁcation date gets, the less power its monetary policy will have.
The results for Slovakia, reported in Table 5.2, indicate that forward rates can be considered
cointegrated with European ones from horizons over ﬁve years, which refers to the year 2011.EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 13
The estimated coefﬁcients are negative and, from that horizon onwards, also quite high in ab-
solute terms. This corresponds well with the Reuters poll, in which all respondents expected
Slovakia to join the EMU in 2011 or before. Also similarly to the Czech case, the euro adjust-
ment parameters are very small and insigniﬁcant.
However, the results are not as clear cut as in the Czech case. One might argue that if the
interest-rate swap market signals a likely date for EMU enlargement, say ¿¤, then after ¿¤, ®C
should remain as negative as at ¿¤ and the fundamental spread ¯C should remain as close to
zero as at ¿¤. However, this seems not to be the case with Slovakia.
Therefore, one may be tempted to test, for example, whether the estimated parameter ®SKK for
the horizon 9¤10 is signiﬁcantly lower in absolute terms than the ones for the shorter horizons.
However, one would perhaps be expecting too much from the method. Recall that the linear
model (3.21) to (3.22) was inspired by the non-linear error-correction relationships (2.15) and
(2.16). Therefore, one should not be surprised by some irregularities. Indeed, the linear method
was chosen for simplicity and as a ﬁrst approximation. Ideally, one should estimate the properly
chosen non-linear speciﬁcation directly.
Cross-country comparisons might be problematic, but weaker error correction could be noticed
for Slovakia when compared to the Czech case for horizons beyond the maximum entry (EMU
Poll) date. One may speculate that the higher historical level and higher volatility of Slovak
interest rates lie behind this result.
The estimation results for Hungary in Table 5.3 reveal a much weaker tendency of Hungarian
rates to revert towards European rates than in the Czech and Slovak cases. There was an indi-
cation of cointegration from the six-year horizon onwards, but the error correction coefﬁcients
are low in absolute terms. However, the Reuters poll maximum is 2016, which is even beyond
the scope of our empirical analysis.
Polish rates, reported in table 5.4, also exhibit a quite weak tendency to revert to euro rates
for longer horizons. The maximum of the EMU poll for Poland is 2015, i.e. on the nine-year
forward. Poland’s historically high and volatile interest rates are consistent with this result. And
note here also that the European parameters ®¤
HF and ®¤
PLZ are again virtually zero.
3.3 Other Countries
To obtain a better feel about the new methodology it might be useful to ponder the results for
other countries that have distinctly different characteristics, namely Denmark, Sweden and the
UK. Denmark participates in the tight ERM II regime, but has negotiated an opt-out clause.
Sweden represents an EU country without an opt-out clause but outside of the ERM II, and the
UK is both outside the ERM II and opting out.
After a referendum that rejected EMU membership in 2000, Denmark participates in the ERM
II with a very narrow ﬂuctuation band for its currency. No new referendum is planned and there
is no chance of Denmark participating in the EMU in the foreseeable future. The effectively
pegged exchange rate with free trade and capital ﬂows means that the Danish central bank has to
mimic the monetary policy of the ECB. Under such circumstances one might naturally expect
Danish forwards not to diverge far from European ones. And indeed, there is cointegration
between these pairs for all horizons, as Table 5.5 shows. However the speed of adjustment ®DK
does not reveal any dependence on horizon, which is intuitive.14 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
Swedish forward rates are cointegrated with European ones and tend to be affected by the dif-
ferential over the euro for almost any horizon. On the other hand, the European coefﬁcient ®¤
SK
again came out small and in most cases insigniﬁcant.
TheUnited Kingdom’sfuture membership in the euro area remains highly uncertain. The pound
ﬂoats freely and is a currency of global importance. Under such circumstances, one should ex-
pect no easily detectable short-term relationship between the dynamics of British and European
forward rates. As demonstrated in Table 5.7, the forward rates tend not to be cointegrated, and
for cases where stationarity of the residuals cannot be rejected the error correction coefﬁcients
®BP are insigniﬁcant.
4. Ofﬁcial Strategies and Survey Interpretations of EMU Enlargement
Sincethelate1990s, Reutersnewswireserviceshavebeenconductingmarketsurveysonseveral
different topics concerning EU and EMU enlargement. During the 1990s, such market polls
were conducted monthly for the old EU Member States, with the results being released and
often compared to several published EMU calculators, such as the JPMorgan EMU calculators
(published in the Financial Times). Currently, these polls are conducted biannually on the
non-euro area EU Member States that joined the EU in May 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, PolandandSlovakia)andinJanuary2007(Bulgaria
and Romania) as well as for several candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey). Reuters surveys
around 30 strategists and political analysts across Europe for their views on dates of joining the
monetary union and the exchange rate mechanism as one of the preconditions prior to EMU
entry. The respondents also provide their expectations about exchange rate parities of national
currencies vis-` a-vis the euro.
The polls provide a genuinely helpful insight into market perceptions about the timing of euro
adoption and about other related issues. However, the results have to be interpreted with some
caution, because there are big outliers among them and also because some of the answers are
not internally consistent. In particular, some responses to questions about ERM II entry and
euro adoption do not reﬂect the Maastricht requirement that a country should remain in the
exchange rate mechanism for at least two years before it is allowed to adopt the euro.
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the latest results on the question of the expected timing of
EMU accession for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
Table 4.1: Expected EMU Entry Dates According Reuters Poll of 38 Professional Respon-
dents in May 2006. (In what year do you expect the following countries to enter the EMU,
i.e. formally adopt the euro?)
Median Mean Mode Latest Earliest
Czech Rep. 2010 2010 2010 2015 2009
Slovakia 2009 2009 2009 2011 2008
Hungary 2010 2011 2010 2016 2010
Poland 2012 2012 2012 2015 2010EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 15
One might expect the Reuters polls to coincide approximately with the ofﬁcial strategies
adopted by these countries5. In mid-2006, the national euro adoption plans in all the sample
countries except for Slovakia were being postponed, mainly due to loose ﬁscal policy and a
worsening ﬁscal stance. Indeed, the Slovak ministry of ﬁnance reported that Slovakia’s prepa-
rations for entering the Eurozone were proceeding according to the government’s plan to adopt
the single currency in 2009.
As regards Poland, in May 2006 its former government set 1 January 2012 as the target date
for euro introduction. Later on, both the National Bank of Poland and the new government
declared an intention to join the euro area as soon as possible, but only after the budget is close
to balance. This is expected to delay ERM II entry until 2011 and euro entry until 2013 or 2014.
However, opinion polls indicate that most Poles would like the euro to be the Polish currency.
At the time of the survey, Hungary was planning to adopt the euro as its ofﬁcial currency on
1 January 2010, but that date has since been abandoned because of an excessively high budget
deﬁcit. Currently, there is no clear target date, but a euro adoption plan is scheduled to be
prepared in mid-2008.
Turning to the Czech Republic, its original plan was to enter the ERM II in 2008 or 2009, which
was later postponed to 2010. However, the current government has ofﬁcially dropped any target
date, saying the Czech Republic will clearly not meet the economic criteria, mainly due to the
large general government deﬁcit. Currently, 2013 is considered the earliest changeover date,
although the recently communicated new euro-adoption strategy does not specify any date for
euro adoption, preferring to wait for future ﬁscal developments and the future impact of ﬁscal
reforms.
Table 4.2: Expected Euro Adoption Dates, as of May 2006.
Estimation Survey (Latest) Survey (Mode) Ofﬁcial strategy
Czech Rep. 2014 2015 2010 date dropped
Slovakia 2011 2011 2009 2009
Hungary > 2015 2016 2010 2010
Poland > 2015 2015 2012 2012
For a general overview of our model estimates, surveys and ofﬁcial dates see Table 4.2. It shows
that the latest date revealed by the poll seems to be the most relevant indicator for comparison
with the empirical method. On the other hand, the modes of the survey responses correspond
very well with the countries’ ofﬁcial strategies.
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper deals with the measurement of market beliefs about the entry of several of the non-
euro area EU countries into the euro area. A novel market-based indicator complements the tra-
ditional so-called EMU calculators, which use the current level of forward interest rate spreads.
5 The national euro-strategies referred to in this section date back to mid-2006, to be in line and comparable with
the results of the Reuters polls of the same date as well as with our estimations.16 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
By contrast, the new indicator makes use of their short-term dynamics. Therefore, it is less de-
pendent on the difﬁcult estimation of the hypothetical non-EMU paths for interest rates, which
are essential for other EMU calculators. Thus, this method might also be suitable for countries
for which the non-EMU scenario is very close to the EMU rates.
The theoretical background to the method is the theory of uncertainty proposed by Bewley
(2002) and recently reﬁned by Rigotti and Shannon (2005). Speciﬁcally, the most important
feature of the theory is that it allows a continuum of equilibrium prices and allocations. This
equilibrium indeterminacy justiﬁes modelling short-term noise in the forward spreads and leads
to the notion of the constrained inaction band and, in general, to non-linear error correction
behaviour.
The empirical investigation that illustrates the theory makes use of a simpliﬁed linear version
of the error-correction model. It was applied on ﬁnancial market data in Central European
countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. The results were
compared with the Reuters EMU Poll survey as well as with the plans presented by national
authorities. It turns out that the latest date revealed by the poll seems to be the most relevant
indicator for the comparison. It is reassuring that our method and the survey results give a
consistent message.
However, the theory of Bewley (2002) and Rigotti and Shannon (2005) is only a static model
and therefore the link to the empirical method is rather suggestive. For explicit treatment of the
subject, one would need a fully speciﬁed dynamic forward-looking model. Also, the empiri-
cal model is a linear approximation of the non-linear error correction supported by theoretical
considerations, and therefore a change in speciﬁcation in this direction may lead to further im-
provement of the results. However, these issues are beyond the scope of the current paper and
are left for future research.
Furthermore, the paper presents a partial equilibrium analysis and treats beliefs about future
interest rates as exogenous. Ideally, beliefs about equilibrating price variables should be derived
from the model parameters via equilibrium analysis. Nevertheless, this also exceeds the narrow
subject of EMU calculators and is also left for possible future investigation.EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 17
Tables
Table 5.1: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for the Czech Republic
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.423 -3.499 -5.531 -5.683 -6.534 -6.966 -8.703 -7.506 -8.393
®CZK -0.153 -0.215 -0.304 -0.340 -0.461 -0.587 -0.765 -0.953 -0.919
(p-value) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
®¤
CZK -0.027 -0.039 0.040 -0.007 -0.014 -0.013 -0.070 0.005 0.070
(p-value) (0.478) (0.396) (0.425) (0.899) (0.806) (0.787) (0.198) (0.932) (0.269)
¯CZK -0.440 -0.232 -0.141 -0.107 -0.080 -0.083 -0.069 -0.035 -0.008
s.e. [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013]
LM test CZK 0.913 0.304 0.966 0.573 0.058 0.381 0.376 0.791 0.549
LM test EU 0.583 0.881 0.277 0.525 0.795 0.368 0.244 0.196 0.956
Table 5.2: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for Slovakia
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.104 -2.227 -3.399 -2.588 -7.309 -8.205 -9.192 -8.931 -7.142
®SKK -0.033 -0.080 -0.282 -0.218 -0.720 -0.757 -0.814 -0.764 -0.453
(p-value) (0.277) (0.123) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
®¤
SKK 0.011 0.036 0.050 0.010 0.046 -0.026 -0.041 -0.041 0.040
(p-value) (0.525) (0.248) (0.308) (0.871) (0.317) (0.465) (0.465) (0.481) (0.425)
¯SKK 0.454 0.294 0.197 0.116 0.038 0.029 -0.027 -0.078 -0.160
s.e. [0.026] [0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013]
LM test SKK 0.535 0.409 0.265 0.985 0.987 0.196 0.249 0.162 0.052
LM test EU 0.198 0.372 0.827 0.371 0.664 0.624 0.628 0.613 0.56118 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
Table 5.3: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for Hungary
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.724 -1.581 -1.755 -1.928 -2.387 -5.797 -3.524 -4.762 -3.513
®HUF -0.211 -0.046 -0.027 -0.046 -0.072 -0.122 -0.231 -0.275 -0.267
(p-value) (0.004) (0.390) (0.575) (0.316) (0.260) (0.125) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009)
®¤
HUF 0.025 -0.007 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.017 0.001 0.012
(p-value) (0.341) (0.798) (0.890) (0.845) (0.834) (0.989) (0.463) (0.971) (0.675)
¯HUF 3.259 3.214 3.118 2.975 2.772 2.547 2.246 1.980 1.748
s.e. [0.019] [0.020] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
LM test HUF 0.632 0.290 0.609 0.356 0.872 0.388 0.517 0.430 0.821
LM test EU 0.673 0.277 0.717 0.066 0.314 0.364 0.413 0.703 0.227
Table 5.4: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for Poland
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.397 -1.969 -2.597 -3.555 -4.018 -3.631 -3.236 -2.563 -5.869
®PLZ -0.063 -0.047 -0.057 -0.070 -0.111 -0.106 -0.175 -0.146 -0.169
(p-value) (0.037) (0.087) (0.107) (0.061) (0.058) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017)
®¤
PLZ -0.010 -0.009 0.005 0.005 0.007 -0.000 -0.011 0.002 0.008
(p-value) (0.454) (0.580) (0.756) (0.765) (0.755) (0.992) (0.604) (0.932) (0.768)
¯PLZ 0.951 1.153 1.245 1.201 1.038 0.932 0.804 0.713 0.622
s.e. [0.034] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.022]
LM test PLZ 0.080 0.206 0.675 0.749 0.968 0.410 0.775 0.845 0.472
LM test EU 0.107 0.744 0.617 0.106 0.171 0.499 0.397 0.372 0.417
Table 5.5: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for Denmark
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.520 -4.236 -6.569 -5.657 -5.003 -5.831 -6.313 -6.045 -7.711
®DKK 0.037 0.063 0.011 -0.078 -0.012 -0.153 -0.069 -0.144 -0.025
(p-value) (0.605) (0.535) (0.925) (0.571) (0.911) (0.270) (0.652) (0.243) (0.862)
®¤
DKK 0.077 0.161 0.139 0.113 0.087 0.105 0.159 0.141 0.284
(p-value) (0.279) (0.099) (0.206) (0.425) (0.402) (0.371) (0.206) (0.265) (0.057)
¯DKK 0.117 0.119 0.117 0.118 0.116 0.123 0.120 0.122 0.121
s.e. [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
LM test DKK 0.652 0.073 0.194 0.041 0.146 0.525 0.472 0.137 0.207
LM test EU 0.758 0.083 0.183 0.124 0.106 0.457 0.501 0.419 0.514EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 19
Table 5.6: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for Sweden
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-2.849 -3.925 -4.660 -4.845 -5.637 -6.449 -7.274 -5.583 -6.398
®SEK -0.115 -0.121 -0.183 -0.252 -0.238 -0.581 -0.658 -0.506 -0.500
(p-value) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.002) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
®¤
SEK -0.011 -0.030 -0.010 -0.023 0.136 0.026 0.086 0.078 0.012
(p-value) (0.772) (0.498) (0.862) (0.750) (0.139) (0.758) (0.345) (0.383) (0.886)
¯SEK -0.115 0.172 0.221 0.194 0.150 0.099 0.015 -0.052 -0.122
s.e. [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
LM test SEK 0.440 0.392 0.367 0.543 0.989 0.981 0.493 0.970 0.350
LM test EU 0.914 0.660 0.108 0.157 0.558 0.315 0.695 0.933 0.282
Table 5.7: Estimated Error Correction Coefﬁcients for the United Kingdom
Horizon
1*2 2*3 3*4 4*5 5*6 6*7 7*8 8*9 9*10
AEG ¿-test, (Crit. values for
1%, 5% and 10% are
¡3:90, ¡3:34 and ¡3:04.)
-4.597 -4.517 -2.445 -2.116 -2.145 -3.647 -3.451 -3.522 -3.192
®GBP -0.016 -0.046 -0.068 -0.058 -0.101 -0.145 -0.138 -0.186 -0.159
(p-value) (0.629) (0.238) (0.100) (0.087) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
®¤
GBP 0.022 0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.019 -0.034 -0.033 -0.032 -0.040
(p-value) (0.540) (0.836) (0.955) (0.915) (0.597) (0.398) (0.395) (0.491) (0.429)
¯GBP 1.203 1.134 0.959 0.810 0.687 0.546 0.382 0.232 0.086
s.e. [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
LM test GBP 0.318 0.565 0.298 0.210 0.808 0.948 0.808 0.134 0.141
LM test EU 0.363 0.760 0.712 0.467 0.404 0.348 0.654 0.866 0.57820 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
Figures
Figure 5.1: Swap curves as of 25 Apr 2006. (Solid line - the local currency IRS, dashed line
the euro IRS. Maturity in years. )























































SwitzerlandEMU Calculators and Ambiguity 21
Figure 5.2: EMU and Czech Republic forward spreads
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Figure 5.3: EMU and Slovakia forward spreads
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Figure 5.4: EMU and Hungary forward spreads
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Figure 5.5: EMU and Poland forward spreads
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Figure 5.6: EMU and Sweden forward spreads
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Figure 5.7: EMU and Denmark forward spreads





Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: spot






Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 1Y






Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 2Y






Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 3Y





Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 4Y









Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 5Y






Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 6Y






Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 7Y





Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 8Y





Forward 1Y difference. Horizon: 9YEMU Calculators and Ambiguity 27
Figure 5.8: EMU and United Kingdom forward spreads
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Appendix: Bootstrapping procedure
In order to ﬁnd out the forward interest rate implied by the swap curve it is convenient ﬁrst to
derive the term structure of interest rates (the zero coupon yield curve). As shown below this is
possible without any approximation for only some types of swaps, but fortunately, in practice,
the suitable swaps are often used. Let Bt;M be the price of the discount bond with maturity M
applicable at time t. Further, let IM
t (m;v) denote the interest rate ﬁxed for the ﬂoating swap
with maturity M as of trade date t; which is based on the ﬂoating rate with maturity m: Let the
ﬁxed leg of the swap be settled v times a year and let all interest rates be expressed in terms of
annual compounding. For simplicity we abstract from any credit risk.
Then the present value of the cash ﬂow for the ﬁxed leg of the swap IM
t (m;v) on the unit












Further, let ft;¿ be the forward rate as of the trade date t at horizon ¿ and maturity T based on
the term structure of risk free bonds. Using this term structure of forward rates, swap sellers6
can hedge their exposure to interest rate risk. The present value of this hedged ﬂoating leg’s






m ¡ 1]Bt;(j+1)m (5.24)
The non-existence of arbitrage opportunities further dictates the relationship between discount
rates and forward rates obviously expressed as
Bt;jm
Bt;(j+1)m
= (1 + ft;jm;m)
m ; (5.25)
so when it is substituted in (5.24) for (1 + ft;jm;m)






and since most of the terms in this series cancel it is possible to conclude that
PVfloating = 1 ¡ Bt;M (5.26)
Since both the ﬁxed leg and the hedged ﬂoating leg represent streams of certain payments, the











v = 1 ¡ Bt;M: (5.27)
6 Swap sellers receive ﬁxed rate and pay ﬂoating rate payments.EMU Calculators and Ambiguity 29
This formula relates prices of discount bonds and interest rate swap rates. Further, if a sufﬁcient
number of interest rate swaps is traded, then it is possible to use this formula to calculate prices


































v are known, then
knowledge of the swap rate IM
t (m;v) enables determination of the discount factor Bt;M.
If these discount bond prices are known, then, similarly to (5.25), one may obtain the implied













The possibility of performing this procedure hinges on the condition that there are enough
points on the swap curve in relation to the settlement frequency of the ﬁxed part of the swap
contracts. In particular, there must be vT equally spaced swap rates to allow determination
of the vT discount factors. On the contrary, there is no such condition on the maturity of the
underlying ﬂoating rate. Fortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly, swap rates are often quoted
for maturities in whole years and with annual settlement, i.e. v = 1; which facilitates the
empirical analysis.30 Martin Cincibuch and Martina Horn´ ıkov´ a
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